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I. INTRODUCTION   
Intellectual property can be a complicated area of the law as it relates to the 
right to assign, pass on, or distribute the rights and ownership interests in intel-
lectual property.  Patents, in particular, pose unique issues due to their regula-
tion in both state and federal law.1   Unlike copyrights and trademarks, patents 
are almost exclusively subject to governance by federal law.2  Because patents 
are largely governed by the United States Patent Act (hereinafter “Patent Act”), 
the majority of patent litigation takes place in federal courts, however, one key 
area where federal law does not exclusively control is the transfer of patents as 
 
1. See Louisa M. Ristick, Intellectual Property Issues in Estate Planning and Administration, 
COLO. LAW., Dec. 2017, at 46, 50. 
2. Lawrence M. Sung, MD. B. ASS’N, Patents, in PATENT, COPYRIGHT, TRADE SECRET, RIGHT 
OF PUBLICITY, TRADEMARK HANDBOOK FOR MARYLAND BUSINESS AND LITIGATION LAWYERS, ch. 
1(I)(A) (2013). 
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personal property.3  Issues of probate and the classification of what makes up 
personal property is an issue reserved to the states, however, not all states make 
it abundantly clear whether patents are classified as property, muddying the 
waters on patent transfer in the event of an intestate decedent.4  
This Comment analyzes the language of the Patent Act as it relates to the 
transfer of ownership interests as they relate to patents, focusing specifically on 
how interests in a patent would transfer in the event of the owner dying intestate 
and not otherwise assigning the interest in the patent.  Additionally, it will ad-
dress how Wisconsin classifies property and does not explicitly list patents as 
property, which creates a potential issue in the probate of patent interests.  Sec-
tion II will introduce patents and some of the issues regarding patent transfer.  
The development of the Patent Act and its language regarding the transfer of 
interests in a patent will be discussed in Section III of this Comment.  Section 
IV will introduce a focused example of how patents are treated in Wisconsin 
specifically and the issues with how states classify personal property for the 
sake of probate law.  This Comment will discuss why the Patent Act can be 
interpreted to show a thread of treating patents as personal property, even if not 
explicitly stated in the earlier iterations of the Patent Act.  Sections V and VI 
will look at the reasoning and interpretation used by courts in the 21st century, 
focusing primarily on three cases from the 2000s that shaped and refined the 
ways in which the Patent Act is applied.  Additionally, the public policy rea-
soning behind the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit deci-
sions in Akazawa v. Link New Technology Intern, Inc., and Sky Technologies 
LLC v. SAP AG will be addressed.  The Comment will conclude in Section VII 
with a brief assessment of the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Patent Act 
and a suggested course of action for states to resolve uncertainty regarding the 
status of patents as personal property.   
II. OVERVIEW OF PATENTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE A CLEAR AND TIMELY 
TRANSFER 
A patent is a grant given by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
that allows the owner of the patent to maintain a monopoly on the subject of 
the patent for a set period of time to have exclusive use and development of an 
invention.5  “To obtain a patent, the new invention must be both (1) novel, 
meaning the invention is different from the prior art . . . and (2) nonobvious, 




5. Ristick, supra note 1, at 49. 
6. Id.  
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an invention or idea must have utility to be patentable.7  Most patents are non-
renewable, and the subject of the patent enters the public domain once the term 
of the patent expires.8   
The value in a patent largely stems from the exclusive right to produce, use 
and profit from the invention.9  The time restrictions on the ownership of a 
patent creates a need for certainty and timeliness in determining how ownership 
interests in a patent are transferred.10  Time spent deliberating on the transfer 
may affect the rights of the owner to capitalize on and profit from the patent.11  
These issues are further complicated when the rights to such a patent need to 
be determined when the decedent owner dies without first assigning the interest 
or creating a testamentary document to devise the interest in the patent.  Addi-
tionally, patent owners must pay regular maintenance and renewal fees to pre-
vent lapse and retain enforceable rights and interests in the patent.12  These fees 
cannot be paid in advance, which creates the potential for loss in opportunity to 
profit off a patent if an owner of a patent does not devise their interest in the 
patent or dies intestate without establishing who will take ownership of the pa-
tent.13 
The Patent Act is much more complex regarding the transfer of patent own-
ership than other intellectual property codes, such as copyrights.14  For exam-
ple, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) states, “The ownership of a copyright may be trans-
ferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or operation of law, and 
may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws 
of intestate succession.”15  The United States Code makes it abundantly clear 
that copyrights are to be treated and transferred in the same manner as personal 
property and explicitly addresses the intestate transfer of a copyright.16  This is 
a stark contrast to how the U.S. Code deals with property rights in patents.17 
One of the most significant attributes of personal property is the ability the 
owner of that property has to transfer, convey, or dispose of that property.18  
 
7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
8. Ristick, supra note 1, at 49. 
9. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS, III, DONALD C. REILEY, III, & ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, PATENT 
LAW BASICS § 12:2 (14th ed. 2019). 
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
11. MILLS ET AL., supra note 9, at § 12:2. 
12. Denise S. Rahne & Shira T. Shapiro, Practical Considerations for Valuing Intellectual 
Property Assets in Estate Planning, 31 PROB. & PROP., no. 4, July–Aug. 2017, at 8, 12. 
13. Id. 
14. See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1401 (1978).  
15. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2010).  
16. Id. 
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
18. MILLS ET AL., supra note 9, at §12:1. 
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This attribute extends to and applies in the same manner to patents.19  Under 35 
U.S.C. § 261, the federal statutes address the issue of ownership of patent rights 
and the ability to assign said patents.20  In the opening line of the section it 
states, “[s]ubject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes 
of personal property . . . .”21 This, however, creates an immediate issue, as the 
section further touches on what can be done with the interests in a patent, stating 
“[a]pplications for a patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable 
in law by an instrument in writing.  The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or 
legal representative may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right 
under his application for patent, or patents . . . .”22  An assignment of a patent 
is sufficient so long as it meets those statutory requirements.23 
This language alone creates an immediate issue, as property is said to have 
attributes of personal property which is typically left for the states to determine 
how personal property can be transferred. However, 35 U.S.C. § 261 immedi-
ately follows up with conflicting language controlling how the interest in the 
patent must be assigned in writing.24  If the patent is not assigned before the 
death of the owner, what happens to the patent?  What testamentary documents 
constitute a property assignment?  In the absence of assignment or testamentary 
disposition of the patent, does the patent move through the probate process and 
intestacy as personal property?  The general rule would seem to be that patents 
transfer by operation of law in a similar manner in which any other personal 
property under the same circumstances would.25 
Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 261 states that after the assignment of the patent, 
the assignees “may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under 
his . . . patent . . . .”26  There is “[n]o particular form [that] is required for the 
assignment of a patent interest and patent assignments are subject to the same 
rules of construction that apply to contracts generally, the intention of the par-
ties being or primary concern in construing them.”27  While this language es-
tablishes that the rules of assignment are similar to those of contracts and that 
the courts take the intent of the parties into account, this does not help to clarify 
 
19. Id. 
20. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
21. Id. 
22. Id.  
23. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 755 (Robert 
Calvert ed. 1964). 
24. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013).  
25. Calvert, supra note 23, at 77. 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013).  
27. United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. 184, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (citing Crosley Radio 
Corporation v. Dart, 160 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1947)). 
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what should take place in the event of the death of the owner of the patent before 
assignment.28  This language directly implicates the way in which an assignee, 
heir, or devisee may use and distribute the interest in the patent.  
35 U.S.C. § 154 states, “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the pa-
tentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”29  This section of the Patent Act 
makes the issue of assignment even more uncertain through the explicit phras-
ing of “heirs or assigns,” which opens the door to the possibility of testate or 
intestate heirs and their potential rights to interest in a patent, even in a scenario 
in which there has not been a proper assignment as outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 
261.30  Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated 
that patents have two natures to them, one in federal law and the other in state 
law.31  The nature of a patent as an exclusive right is a matter for the federal 
courts to handle, whereas the issue of ownership of the patent and those rights 
is generally a question of state law.32 
There also exists a “probate exception,” which has been recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court, which denies a federal court from distributing 
any assets in a decedent’s estate and reserving that power to state law.33 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LANGUAGE AND PROTECTIONS OF THE PATENT 
ACT 
The first version of the Patent Act was passed by the federal government in 
1790, shortly after the United States Constitution was ratified.34  The Patent Act 
of 1790 set basic guidelines that proved to be comparatively simple to patent 
law in the years to come.35  The Patent Act of 1790 specified that “any useful 
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not 
before known or used” could be the subject of patent protection.36  Additionally, 
it was left to the discretion of the United States Secretary of State, the Secretary 
for the Department of War, and the United States Attorney General to 
 
28. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp. at 201. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). 
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013).  
31. Jim Arnold Corp. v.  Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
32. Id. 
33. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (first citing Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 
490 (1946); then citing Sutton v. English 246 U.S. 199 (1918); and then citing Waterman v. Canal-
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909)). 
34. P. J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237 (April ed. 
1936), reprinted in 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 33 (Supp. 2003). 
35. Id.  
36. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110–12 (1790) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
1–390 (2012)). 
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determine whether the invention was “sufficiently useful and important” to 
warrant a patent.37  The term of each patent was not to exceed fourteen years.38 
Most relevant to this topic, the Patent Act of 1790 does not specifically 
address the nature in which interests in a patent may be transferred or as-
signed.39  However, when discussing the penalties for infringing on a patent, 
the Patent Act of 1790 lists that any awarded damages shall be given to “the 
said patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns 
. . . .”40  This language was repeated throughout the Patent Act of 1790, which 
seems to establish that while there is no direct provision of how patent interests 
could be transferred, conveyed, or assigned, the transfer could still occur be-
cause their assigns could be entitled to damages in the event of  a successful 
infringement suit.41  The lack of specificity as to how these transfers would be 
governed can be interpreted to show that the interest in the patent would transfer 
just as any other personal property at the time.  
In 1793 amendments were made to the Patent Act of 1790, creating the 
Patent Act of 1793.42  Substantial additions and changes were made to the pro-
cess of applying for a patent.43  For the purposes of this Comment, the most 
notable change came in Section 4 of the Patent Act of 1793.44  Section 4 stated,  
[I]t shall be lawful for any inventor, his executor or administrator to 
assign the title and interest in the said invention . . . and the assignee 
having recorded the said assignment, in the office of the Secretary of 
State, shall thereafter stand in the place of the original inventor, both as 
to right and responsibility, and so the assignees of assigns, to any de-
gree.45  
Included was an official provision allowing for the assignment of patent 
interests and direction as to how the assignment must occur.46  More signifi-
cantly, the Patent Act of 1793 also affirmatively stated that the assignee has the 
same rights as the original inventor and can assign the patent if they so desire.47  
 
37. Id.  
38. Id. 
39. Id. § 4.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. §§ 1, 4.  
42. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §§ 1–12, 1 Stat. 318, 319–23 (1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–390 (2012)). 
43. Id. § 3.   
44. Id. § 4.  
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. § 12. 
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While there is not much clarity with regards to how a patent interest would be 
assigned in the event of an intestate decedent, the inclusion that an administra-
tor or executor of an estate can assign a patent would seem to establish that the 
executor or administrator would do so in a manner similar to other personal 
property.  This interpretation, if accurate, would fall in line with the proposed 
reading of the Patent Act of 1790.  
The Patent Act of 1793 remained in effect until the Patent Act of 1836 re-
placed it.48  One of the major changes included the establishment of the Patent 
Office to preside over the issues of patent issuance and enforcement rather than 
the Secretary of State.49  This iteration of the Patent Act again elaborated on the 
transfer of patent interests implied through the use of specific language in Sec-
tion 5 of the 1836 Patent Act.50  Here, “[e]very such patent shall . . . in its terms 
grant to the applicant or applicants, his or their heirs, administrators, executors, 
or assigns, for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right 
and liberty of . . . the said invention or discovery . . . .”51  Section 11 goes into 
detail on assignments of a patent interest, stating, “[E]very patent shall be as-
signable in law, either as to the whole interest, or any undivided part thereof, 
by any instrument in writing . . . .”52 
The inclusion of the term “heirs” in the Patent Act of 1836 shows a clear 
intent to allow for the passage of patents through spousal or familial connec-
tion.53  It is also of note that the term “heirs” was added to the language of the 
Patent Act of 1836 and did not serve to replace the possibility of assignment or 
simply take its place.54  
The basic structure of modern patent law was established with the Patent 
Act of 1952, which is currently still used in its amended form.55  The Patent Act 
of 1952 recognized that patents shall have the same attributes and be treated as 
personal property.56  This explicit statement and affirmation removed some of 
the doubt as to how patent interests were to be recognized by the law, seemingly 
allowing for patents to be transferred, held, or used in the same manner as any 
other personal property.57  This treatment also applies to the disposition of the 
 
48. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 1–21, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 
1–390 (2012)). 
49. Id. § 1.  
50. Id. § 5.  
51. Id. (emphasis added). 
52. Id. § 11. 
53. Id. § 5.  
54. Id.  
55. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 
792, 793–814). 
56. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
57. Id.  
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interest in the patent at the time of the owner’s death whether they died intestate 
or with a testamentary device in place.58 
Additionally, the Patent Act of 1952 followed the Patent Act of 1836 in 
using the term “heirs” when addressing the provisional rights of patent owner-
ship.59  35 U.S.C. § 154 reaffirmed that an heir may have an interest in a patent 
by stating, “Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant 
to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others . . . .”60  This 
language of the Patent Act of 1952 largely affirms the thread throughout the 
previous Patent Acts that there is a general right to convey the interests in a 
patent as one wishes. It also distinguishes assignees from heirs, although not in 
great detail, showing that there may be different treatment of members in either 
group and that formalities must be followed in transferring a patent interest to 
each group.61 
IV. FOCUS ON WISCONSIN PROBATE AND PROPERTY STATUTORY 
DEFINITIONS 
Because probate and property law are controlled on a state level, classifica-
tions as to what property can transfer automatically via operation of law as non-
probate property upon the death of an intestate decedent are reserved to the 
individual states.62  Wisconsin Statute Section 705.10 addresses which property 
is non-probate upon death and not subject to the probate process.63  The statute 
makes no mention of patents being a non-probate transfer, thus making patents 
a form of property that is subject to probate in the event that the owner dies 
intestate.64  
However, under Wisconsin probate law, property is defined as “any inter-
est, legal or equitable, in real or personal property, without distinction as to 
kind, including money, rights of a beneficiary under a contractual arrangement, 
choses in action, digital property, as defined in [section] 711.03(10), and any-
thing else that may be the subject of ownership.”65  Patents are not explicitly 
listed in the statutory definition of property, and can only be inferred to be in-
cluded through the catch all clause “and anything else that may be the subject 
of ownership.”66  Patents are not like other items in that they expire and their 
 
58. Id. 
59. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Id.  
62. WIS. STAT. § 705.10(1) (2015). 
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. WIS. STAT. § 851.27 (2015) (emphasis added). 
66. Id.  
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ownership is not indefinite or tangible in the way that personal property might 
be.67  While a Wisconsin court may be likely to include a patent under the um-
brella clause of being subject to ownership, there is an unnecessary amount of 
wiggle room left in the exclusion of express mention of patents as property.68  
This ambiguity creates a potential problem, because while the Patent Act treats 
patents as personal property under federal law, this treatment and classification 
does not trickle down and apply to state law, leaving the issue to the state leg-
islature or statutes and their definitions of what constitutes property.69 
V. CONFUSION IN CASE LAW OVER VALID AVENUES OF PATENT TRANSFER 
As recently as 2003, it was shown how the Patent Act’s language and nature 
caused confusion and uncertainty in the federal courts with regard to how an 
interest in a patent might be assigned.70  In Frugoli v. Fougnies, the court stated 
that it believed “the only way title to a patent may be transferred is by assign-
ment.”71  The case was brought before the court when an inventor sued his em-
ployer for fraudulently omitting the inventors name from the patent applica-
tion.72  The court’s statement came in the process of rejecting the defense’s 
claim for summary judgment on the premise that the plaintiff-inventor dis-
claimed his interests in the patent and assigned those interests to his employer 
when he signed an employment agreement at the beginning of his employ-
ment.73  The court rejected this argument.74  The court cited a treatise from 
Ernest Liscomb III on patents, citing that title to patent only passes by assign-
ment, which had been accepted as authoritative on the issue in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.75   
While this case specifically dealt with the creation and assignments of pa-
tents in a workplace setting, the ruling of the court was still of note, as it gen-
erally stated that assignment was the only way to transfer an interest of a pa-
tent.76  There was no qualifying statement that this specific idea related only to 
a workplace or work product setting.77  It is not certain whether its holdings on 
 
67. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
68. WIS. STAT. § 851.27 (2015). 
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
70. Frugoli v. Fougnies, No. CIV 02-957-PHX RCB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26651, at *13–14 
(D. Ariz. July 24, 2003). 
71. Id. at *15. 
72. Id. at *3. 
73. Id. at *12–13. 
74. Id. at *14. 
75. Id. at *13–14 (citing 5 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LISCOMB III, LISCOMB’S WALKER ON 
PATENTS § 19.1 (3d Ed. 1986); United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
76. Frugoli, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26651, at *6–7. 
77. Id. at *13–14.  
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the ownership interests and their transferability only applied in the case before 
them, or whether in all circumstances, even of an intestate death of an owner of 
a patent, the same requirement of assignment would apply to convey proper 
ownership interest in a patent.78   
VI. FEDERAL CASE LAW AFFIRMING PATENT TRANSFER VIA OPERATION OF 
LAW  
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals addressed patent transfer as an oper-
ation of law and intestacy in 2008 in Akazawa v. Link New Technology Inter-
national, Inc., a case that has been repeatedly cited to as the primary authority 
for related patent transfer disputes.79  Yasumasa Akazawa was an inventor and 
the sole named inventor for U.S. Patent No. 5,615,716 (hereafter listed as the 
“716 patent”).80  Akazawa lived in Japan, and at the time of his death in March 
of 2001, passed without any executed will or testamentary document.81  This 
created a novel issue for the court, as Akazawa was living in Japan underneath 
Japanese intestacy law while owning a United States patent that had not been 
assigned before his death.82  Because there was no testamentary disposition of 
the patent, it was left to determine who the ownership and assignment rights of 
the 716 patent belonged to.83  Akazawa had two daughters and a wife who sur-
vived him and each survivor believed they had ownership interests in the patent 
under Japanese intestacy law.84  The two daughters assigned their interests in 
the patent to their mother initially.85  Then their mother assigned the whole in-
terest in the patent to a third-party, Akira Akazawa.86 
In 2003 Akira, joined by Palm Crest Inc., brought suit alleging patent in-
fringement against Link New Technology International.87  The district court 
ruled that Japanese intestacy law may be used to determine who the patent 
could be transferred to upon death, but that the assignment of the patent after 
 
78. See id. 
79. Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1354–58 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discuss-
ing a patent for an Engine Coolant Changing Apparatus that changes a radiator engine’s coolant with-
out requiring manipulation of the radiator drain or requiring a vehicle with such devices to be put on a 
jack). 
80. Id. at 1355. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id.  
85. Id. 
86. Id. The court does not directly mention that Akira Akazawa is kin or related to Yasumasa 
or his family despite sharing the same last name. Because of this ambiguity they will be addressed as 
a third party rather than a family member for the purposes of this Comment. 
87. Id. 
LOGIC_MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/21  12:52 PM 
2020] TRANSFER OF PATENT RIGHTS 251 
 
death must be governed by the Patent Act.88  The court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant on the basis that the estate of Akazawa held the patent, 
but Akira failed to produce a writing that showed a proper assignment of the 
patent interest  from the estate under the Patent Act.89  The plaintiffs moved for 
appeal, focused on the requirements of patent assignment under 35 U.S.C. § 
261, which states “[a]pplications for patent, patents, or any interests therein, 
shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing . . . .”90  
On appeal, the defendant appellees argued that there must be a valid and 
proper assignment of an interest in a patent when there is a transfer of a patent 
upon death and that the conflict must only be resolved based on United States 
law and the Patent Act because the patent was filed under these laws.91  As 
such, the appellant did not have standing to sue because they could not estab-
lish: (1) there was a writing transferring the patent from the estate of Akazawa 
to his daughters or wife, (2) there was a writing documenting the assignment of 
the interests of the daughters to the mother, and (3) Akira was assigned any 
interests in the patent by writing either from the estate directly or from the 
mother as purported by the appellants.92  The appellants countered by proposing 
that the Japanese law of intestacy was applicable in this conflict and that the 
interest in the patent, which is classified as property, is transferred upon death 
to the decedent’s heirs and was never property of the estate.93 
However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the district court’s hyper-focus on 35 U.S.C. § 261 was 
not proper and that 35 U.S.C. §154 needed to be addressed in relation to this 
conflict over assignment.94  35 U.S.C. § 154 states that “[e]very patent shall 
contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or 
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .”95  The district court 
focused on the language of the statute, specifically stating that the statute men-
tions “heirs or assigns” rather than solely saying “assigns.”96  The court stated 
that there is nothing in 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 or 261 that limits the transferring the 
ownership of a patent solely by written assignment.97  Rather, the case law 
 
88. Id.  
89. Id.  
90. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1355. 
91. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1355.  
92. Id. at 1356.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. 
95. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).  
96. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356–57. 
97. Id.  
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regarding patent ownership has established that it may be transferred by oper-
ation of state law.98  
The precedent that was cited in support of this statement came from a Wis-
consin case that went before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1983.99  In this case there was a similar dispute over how the patent 
would transfer after the owner has bequeathed the patent in a will and pro-
ceeded to pass.100  The court in Stickle ruled that under Texas law, the title to 
the patent immediately vests in the devisee upon death.101  The distinction be-
tween Stickle and Akazawa is that in Stickle there was a valid and properly ex-
ecuted will devising the interests in the patent, whereas there was no such in-
strument in Akazawa.102  However, the Akazawa court held that the importance 
of the Stickle holding was that the title to a patent may be transferred according 
to state probate law.103  The Akazawa court made it clear that state law governs 
patent ownership rather than federal law, even as it relates to determining own-
ership of a patent following the death of the owner.104  The court noted that 35 
U.S.C. § 261 stated that only assignments of a patent had to be in writing.105  
Thus, patent ownership may pass as an operation of law without any formal 
documentation or writing validating the transfer.106 
Ultimately the case was vacated and remanded to the district court to deter-
mine how the Japanese intestacy law should be applied in this conflict.107  The 
court stated that if the patent was found to be transferred to the daughters and 
mother through Japanese intestacy law, then the transfers afterward would con-
vey ownership to Akira without the need for a written assignment.108  Here, it 
is clear that the Federal Circuit held state probate and intestacy laws may be 
used to transfer the interests in a patent without need for a formal written as-
signment.109  In an instance where there is not a valid will or document assign-
ing the interest in the patent, under 35 U.S.C. § 154 the interest in the patent 
 
98. Id.; see Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
99. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1557–58; see Winkler v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 105 F. 190, 190–
91 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900) (“Under Indiana law, if there be no debts and no administration, personal 
property vests by operation of law in the next of kin. [citation omitted] This patent . . . was not admin-
istered and passed by operation of law to those legally entitled to it.”). 
100. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1556–57. 
101. Id. at 1557. 
102. Id.; Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356–57.  
103. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1357. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 1356. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1358. 
108. Id.   
109. Id. 
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may still be conveyed to an heir, and any subsequent transfers would also be 
valid.110 
In the year following Akazawa, the Federal Circuit again heard a case that 
raised the issue of transfer of patents and whether state or federal law controls 
the transfer of interests in patents.111  The case tasked the court with determin-
ing whether the district court properly relied on Akazawa in holding that a pa-
tent can be transferred via state foreclosure law.112  The question came about 
after an owner of patents, Conklin, assigned all of his interests in the patents to 
a company, Orzo, which later executed an Intellectual Property Security Agree-
ment with two separate companies to secure a loan in exchange for the right to 
the patents in the event of default.113  The security agreement eventually came 
to rest solely in the hands of a single company, XACP.114  Orzo eventually de-
faulted on their loan obligations, and as a result, XACP issued a foreclosure 
notice identifying that the patents would be sold at public auction.115 
At the auction, XACP was the only bidder on the patents.116  Subsequently, 
XACP assigned all of its interests in the patents to Conklin, who had started a 
company named Sky Technologies and sought to regain ownership of the pa-
tents.117  At no point during the foreclosure process and assignment to Conklin 
did Orzo execute any form of written assignment to XACP after defaulting on 
their loan obligations, which triggered the foreclosure.118  In 2006, Conklin and 
Sky Technologies filed a patent infringement suit against the defendants, SAP 
AG.119  SAP AG moved to have Sky Technologies’ claims dismissed for lack 
of standing because the patents were never assigned to XACP and could not be 
assigned to Sky Technologies.120  The district court heard arguments as to 
whether the security interest completed by Orzo and XACP transferred only 
substantial rights, similar to that of licensing, or whether the title transferred 
completely to XACP and held that the patents were fully transferred from Orzo 
to XACP through the foreclosure proceedings that took place in 2003.121  The 
district court relied on the Akazawa court’s opinion and holding in making its 
 
110. Id. at 1356. 
111. Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
112. Id. at 1376. 
113. Id. at 1376–77. 
114. Id. at 1377. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1378. 
117. Id.  
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
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decision that the chain of title had never been broken, and the assignment to 
Sky Technologies was valid.122 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit heard the case 
on interlocutory appeal to answer whether XACP had the legal right to transfer 
the interests in the patents in question.123  The court stated, “Usually, federal 
law is used to determine the validity and terms of an assignment, but state law 
controls any transfer of patent ownership by operation of law not deemed an 
assignment.”124  Here, the transfer in question occurred through state foreclo-
sure law and not assignment.125  Thus the requirements of the Patent Act did 
not apply, just as they would not apply had the dispute over ownership been 
caused by the probate and distribution of an intestate estate under state law.126  
“[T]he district court’s reliance on [Akazawa’s] reasoning was appropriate be-
cause transfer of patent ownership by operation of law is permissible without a 
writing.”127  Additionally, the court dismissed the defendant’s claim that if state 
law is allowed to transfer patent ownership without following the writing re-
quirement, then federal preemption must occur in accord with 35 U.S.C. § 
261-reiterating that 35 U.S.C § 261 only speaks to assignments and not trans-
fers by operation of law.128  It appears that the court hoped to quash future 
claims on the same grounds of federal preemption by underlying the signifi-
cance of whether a transfer of ownership interests in a patent occurred through 
assignment or operation of law.129  
Finally, the court in Sky Technologies further justified its holding in support 
of public policy.130  “[B]y restricting transfer of patent ownership only to as-
signments, the value of patents could significantly diminish because patent 
owners would be limited in their ability to use patents . . . .”131  Requiring an 
assignment to transfer patent interests in all situations would add complexity 
and be impracticable to most people.132   
The significance of this case is that state law is deferred to with regards to 
the transfer of patents, just as personal property, and the process by which that 
 
122. Id.  
123. Id. at 1378–79. 
124. Id. at 1379. 
125. Id. at 1380. 
126. Id. at 1381. 
127. Id. at 1380. 
128. Id. at 1381. 
129. See id.  
130. Id. at 1381–82. 
131. Id. at 1381. 
132. Id. at 1381–82. 
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transfer must be completed.133  Only in an instance of assignment, as stated in 
35 U.S.C. § 261, does there need to be a formal writing and document that 
conforms to the Patent Act.134  So long as the transfer meets the requirements 
of the relevant state, the transfer will be deemed valid and solely a matter of 
state law.135  In an instance where there is an intestate decedent with ownership 
of a patent, the patent will transfer via operation of law in accordance with the 
intestacy statute of the applicable state, as shown by both Akazawa and Sky 
Technologies.136   
VII. CONCLUSION  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit successfully 
clarified the manner in which interests in a patent may be transferred or con-
veyed in the absence of an assignment, testamentary document, or otherwise in 
its holdings in Akazawa and Sky Technologies.  In holding that patents may be 
transferred as an operation of law and that 35 U.S.C. § 261 only requires that 
assignments be in writing, the Federal Circuit ensured public policy would be 
protected by allowing the transfer of ownership interest to occur through state 
intestacy law.  It would be contrary to the public interest to allow for a valuable 
and otherwise valid patent to lapse in the event of an untimely death of the 
owner.  As such, the decisions in Akazawa and Sky Technologies ensure that 
the state’s rights to determine the transfer of personal property, of which patents 
are recognized, as being reserved to the states rather than being controlled 
through the Patent Act.  In the balancing act between state and federal law, it 
appears that the Federal Circuit made the right and rational choice in its inter-
pretation and application of the law in cases of patent transfers. 
It would be beneficial for clarifying language to be added to the Patent Act, 
mirroring the Copyright Act’s language, which directly addresses the issue of 
intestacy and the treatment of copyrights as personal property.  Individual states 
would also be better served to explicitly name patents and other forms of intel-
lectual property as personal property in attempts to prevent confusion during 
and intestate probate proceeding or where intellectual property has not been 
devised through a testamentary instrument.  The federal government should is-
sue an instruction to the states addressing the language issue and urge the states 
to adopt similar language to the Patent Act, affirmatively stating that patents 
will be treated as personal property.  This would serve to remove any doubt in 
the minds of patent owners and estate planning attorneys.  When estate planning 
 
133. Id. at 1380. 
134. Id. at 1381. 
135. Id. at 1380. 
136. Id.; Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1358. 
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or probate and patents come together, it is a confluence of law where attorneys 
rarely have experience or knowledge of both areas.  This is why it is imperative 
to make state statutes on the matter as plain and clear as possible.  
Estate planning attorneys need to carefully consider and catalog any intel-
lectual property interests that their clients own when drafting testamentary doc-
uments or planning for the future.  While it appears that the law has shifted to 
protect ownership interests in a patent that an intended heir may have, the only 
way to truly protect the owners is to properly address the intellectual property 
interests.  Estate planning attorneys need to be aware of the intricacies of the 
transfer of intellectual property interests so that their clients can fully maximize 
the value of the intellectual property and hopefully avoid the costs of litigating 
a dispute over the ownership of the interest.  It would likely be in the best in-
terest of an attorney who is planning the estate of a client with intellectual prop-
erty interests to consult and work with a colleague who specializes in intellec-
tual property law.  This is especially true for patents, as there is a very limited 
window of time in which patent interest owners can benefit before the patent 
expires.  Because of the limited length of patent protection, the protections may 
very well expire before they transfer through a testamentary device.  
 
